The Supreme Court takes a civil case on the sanctity of jury deliberations

As I have said before in these pages, I have interviewed each jury after each jury trial I have conducted since I started as a Magistrate Judge way back 1987.  My intent was to learn how I could do a better job, and also to help the jurors decompress. I always end the interview by telling the jurors that they may speak with the lawyers if they wish to provide counsel with a critique of the lawyers’ performance. I caution the jurors not to speak about the substance of the deliberations; that is, what the jurors said or did as they deliberated. I avoid that information as well when I interview the jury.

The Supreme Court has now taken a case from the Eighth Circuit that broadly speaking raises the question of what information lawyers are entitled to know regarding what was said during jury deliberations. The case comes from the Eighth Circuit and was written by Judge Bye and concurred in by Judges Wollman and Colloton.  Anyone who knows about the Eighth Circuit knows that the panel was about as diverse ideologically speaking  as one could draw.

The plaintiff’s lawyers wanted to use a post-verdict affidavit from one juror about the statement of another juror during deliberations. During the deliberations, one juror said that another juror revealed that her daughter has been at fault in a fatal car accident. “She related,” so said the affiant said, “that if her daughter had been sued, it would have ruined her life.” Other jurors echoed her statement, he said.

Judge Bye’s opinion is clear and well written.  Basically, Judge Bye said that Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) means what is says–you don’t get to use information from jurors to get after the verdict unless the exceptions apply.  None did. That was true even if the statement was intended to prove that the juror was not forthcoming during voir dire. The Supreme Court has taken the case for review. See Adam Liptak, Challenging the Privacy of Statements Made During Jury Deliberations, New York Times (September 15, 2014) (hat tip to How Appealing). The Court apparently took the case because of a split in the Circuits. The Ninth Circuit, and perhaps others, held that statements which tend to show deceit during voir dire are not barred by Rule 606.  On the other hand, the Third Circuit in an opinion written but then Judge Alito and the Tenth Circuit went the way of the Eighth Circuit.

I am betting that the Supreme Court affirms the Eighth Circuit. The fact that Justice Alito sided with the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning when he was a Third Circuit judge provides extra “umph” to those who would interpret Rule 606(b) strictly. What do I think is the correct result?

I think Judge Bye got it right. Moreover, I have a visceral reaction against lawyers using post-verdict statements from jurors. What do you think? In commenting, please also tell me whether you make it a practice to interview jurors after the verdict and tell me whether you learn anything of value?


33 responses

  1. I don’t know why it would be inappropriate to challenge a verdict based on statements of jurors during deliberations that show that jurors relied on something outside the record, something improper,or simply chose to disregard the court’s instructions. I realize that the secret of jury trials and the legal myth is that jurors follow instructions like good little soldiers, and that somehow Judges get angry at exposing the untruth of that myth, but aren’t parties really entitled to a trial under the rules laid down in the law as a matter of fact? What if jurors during deliberations discussed the race of the defendant and started to use some stereotype beliefs about race to reach conclusions and convict? The rule is really just there to avoid the truth coming out under some theory that jury deliberations can’t withstaand scrutiny and will make us all uncomfortable if what “really” happened in deliberations were known. If jurors knew they may be held to account for what they say in deliberations, they might be a lot more careful than if they knew their statements were somehow secret. The simple truth is that judges can handle these issues without a rule that says, “you don’t even need to hear about it, don’t trouble yourself.”

  2. Initially, my sense was that Mr. Stowers’ comment was perfect for this blog — a kind of “legal realism,” if you will. But I was troubled by the idea that “[jurors] might be a lot more careful than if they knew their statements [would become public].” In my mind, the secrecy of jury deliberations is designed to protect the jury from inappropriate outside influences. That is, the private deliberations allow a jury to focus on getting the RIGHT result, not the result most palatable to Monday morning quarterbacks.

    Of course, some “inappropriate outside influences” enter the deliberation room with the jurors, and Mr. Stowers makes reference to some of them (racism, etc.). But I’m not sure that exposing deliberations solves that problem as much as it trades it for another: I can imagine jurors who, knowing their comments and actions may become public, will self-consciously enforce a different kind of bias: the progressive who is unwilling to convict a sympathetic defendant, the conservative who is determined to be “tough on crime,” etc.

    To the Judge’s specific question, my limited experience with post-verdict interviews was initially horrifying: I couldn’t believe the things that turned out to be important to the jury!

    Once I resigned myself to the fact that a lawyer’s themes and narratives are seldom accepted by a jury, it has served as a reminder that an attorney needs to be open to alternative narratives and provide evidence favorable to the case even if the evidence isn’t clearly part of a narrowly-focused theme.

    Conversely, I am reminded of the importance of limiting or responding to virtually every detail of the other side’s case, as it is difficult to predict which tidbit may turn the tide in the jury room. All of this is counter to my training, which emphasized developing a simple and persuasive story, then presenting evidence and argument that leads jurors irresistibly down the path you want them to walk. I’ll be interested in hearing others’ comments about the value of a focused vs. broad presentation of evidence.

    Very early in my career I was lucky enough to learn from a well-regarded state judge who had spent decades as a trial judge and then more decades as an appellate judge. More than once he marveled that, though the jury pool was not always filled with “ideal” candidates (from the litigants’ or the judge’s perspective) and the deliberations were frequently odd or disturbing, the judge strongly believed that juries almost always “get it right.” Perhaps it is easier to be so philosophical from the other side of the bench, but I work hard to remember that.

  3. DBS,

    Legal realism cuts in favor of the result reached by the Eighth Circuit. We don’t want jurors looking over their shoulders as they deliberate. It is hard enough for Article III judges to do the “right thing” having life tenure. A jury of lay people cannot be expected to do the “right thing” when they fear that they will become the center piece of a post-verdict fire storm.

    All the best.


  4. I think the 8th Circuit should be affirmed. Otherwise, lawyers will ask a general question in voir dire such as “could you judge the case fairly and impartially,” only to move for a new trial when the lawyer learns that, during deliberations, the juror said, “I tend to think plaintiffs treat the civil justice system like the lottery.” The lawyer post-trial will no doubt claim that this mid-deliberations statement would have justified a for-cause challenge, but the faulty premise underlying the new trial motion is the implied assertion that the juror’s mid-deliberations statement somehow proves that the juror lied by saying s/he could be fair and impartial.

  5. If the jury wasn’t fair and impartial and one party loses as a result, that party would not have received due process of law. Since due process is the whole point, any evidence tending to show that the jury was not fair and impartial must be considered, unless Federal Rules of Evidence are now trumping constitutional considerations.

    I have often chatted with jurors after a verdict. Always interesting, less often helpful going forward.

  6. The time to determine if a juror can be fair or impartial is during jury selection, through specific targeted questions. Asking “can you be fair” and getting an affirmative reply shouldn’t entitile a party to a do-over when the juror later says something (during deliberations or to the press) that shows that he or she had a viewpoint that could have been uncovered during jury selection with better questioning. The later statement isn’t proof of a lie under McDonough, and labeling it as such is going to lead to enormous mischief by anyone who wants to undo an adverse verdict.

  7. I disagree with some of what has been said. We do want jurors looking over their shoulders as they deliberate. Jury Nullification occurs too frequently if they don’t. The Due Process rights of a litigant depend on 1) honest accurate voir dire responses, 2) jurors following the law, and 3) jurors basing their decision on just the evidence and not on extrinsic information. While the general rule should be that you cannot invade a jury’s deliberations, an exception must be allowed where one of the three types of juror misconduct has occurred. No amount of virtue concerning the preservation of vague broad policy justifies such hi-jacking of the system of justice in those three instances.

  8. You’re strumming my chords the last couple days.

    Leave deliberations alone. Setting aside the obvious constitutional concerns, Lawyers would make a mess of every jury verdict.

    I never seek out jurors, and usually stall in leaving the room until I think they’re gone. For the most part, this is probably unnecessary, as I don’t think the jurors want to talk to the lawyers–they want to go home. If they are waiting outside when I leave, they’re going to have to keep up the pace to talk to me.

    They did just that once. After a trial I thought surely lost, the verdict came back for my client. I wandered about the courtroom after the jury was discharged; spoke to the lawyers; spoke to the judge; spoke to the clerk; spoke to the reporter; and spoke to the security officer. When I ran out of people to talk to, I left.

    The jury was still there, talking to the non-prevailing attorney. I told my group to keep up and we aimed toward the elevator. The foreman stopped me, saying, “when we went out it was 6-2 against you. I wasn’t going to let that happen.” I thanked him, then laughed through the entire 10-story elevator ride.

    The jury is in charge of the jury room. They don’t need us to invade. During deliberations in another trial, the jury sent out a note that they didn’t think one of them should be in the room. That’s all it said. The judge had been on the bench for more than 20 years, and candidly informed us that he didn’t know what to do. The juror was interviewed and dismissed because his best friend was the mayor of the city that was sued.

    My point is that jurors can police themselves, but they sometimes might not know that they are allowed to police themselves. That’s a pretty good reason to edit the jury instructions. In every subsequent case, I’ve asked for an instruction that tells the jurors that they must report improprieties to the court. Sometimes, but rarely, It happens.

  9. @D.N.

    Maybe my quibble is more with what is being put forward after trial as proof that the juror was dishonest. It’s easy when a juror conceals a conviction, and then you discover the conviction. But if the juror says (in voir dire) “I can be fair and impartial” and then says in deliberations or post-trial that “plaintiffs lawyers [or criminal defense lawyers] tend to be jerks who play fast and loose with the facts,” should we really summon the juror in for an inquisition into whether s/he concealed a secret bias against plaintiffs’ [criminal defense] attorneys? Every loose remark like that will turn into a post-trial hearing, which would surely chill deliberations.

    Someone mentioned earlier that a juror’s post-trial statement that s/he ignored jury instructions would be grounds for relief. But the unanimous weight of authority says the opposite: jurors in a criminal trial have told reporters that theyheld it against the defendant that he did not testify. While troubling, Rule 606(b) makes that OFF-LIMITS for purposes of a new trial motion. Now, I suppose, the defendant could move for a new trial claiming that the juror lied during voir dire when s/he said s/he could follow the judge’s instructions, but the later comment does not prove that the juror lied. Perhaps the juror thought s/he could follow instructions, but was unable to do so. The candid revelation post-verdict should not lead to a hearing and, potentially, a new trial.

    My two cents (discounted to presvent value).

  10. Skink,

    The “report impropriety” instruction you refer to interests me. I have never given one of those. I am interested in the exact wording, for among other reasons, because I worry about setting off a war among jurors. If you have time, would you mail me a copy of the wording you favor at If I think it would be of interest to others, I might post it.

    Thank you. All the best.


    PS If it easier to post a comment with the wording, feel free to do so instead of going the e-mail route.

  11. Mr. Nasser (not sure if “Dean” is a name or title), I don’t think you are describing jury nullification as “hi-jacking of the system of justice,” but I’m not sure I understand why nullification is otherwise included in your comment. Please clarify if the opportunity arises.

  12. I’m not a lawyer, and I have no time to read, much less study, the 8th Circuit decision. But I can say in general that if you allow second-guessing after the verdict, beyond the exceptions in 606 that allow one to show that the process was corrupted, then will any jury verdict be safe? What happens to the right of a jury trail, if second-guessing is allowed over various other matters? If deceitful answers in voir-dire can be considered, the camel’s nose is well into the tent.

  13. DBS.

    Dean is my name. I’m a trial lawyer in my 40th year of practice.

    Jury nullification while romantic cuts both ways and leaves justice behind. A juror should never be able to say I don’t care about my oath or the law, I like this guy; I don’t like that Guy; I don’t like this about this guy nor that guy; and therefore I’m just going to do what I want. If you envision a black man in Alabama or Mississippi on trial in the 1950s you can more readily see why the oath and following the law are crucial.

    If we allow untruthfulness to infect the justice system and immunize it from scrutiny, we can trust human nature to thwart freedom. We should never tolerate untruthfulness.

    Kindest regards, Dean

  14. Well stated, and mirrors my own experiences based on 34+ years of trying cases to juries (civil) in mostly rural areas – Nebraska and Iowa. Yes, juries sometimes (I say seldom) get it all “wrong”, but the experienced judge was correct, juries “almost always get it right” and a form of justice that most reasonable people can accept is the result.

  15. Thanks Dean!

    There’s no doubt you’re right about the terrible problems that can arise when a jury is unwilling to follow the law, but I perceive an important difference between juries who refuse to participate in an unjust process and a jury who disregards justice out of favoritism.

    Perhaps I’m using the term in a nonstandard way, so let me clarify: your Jim Crow example is about a jury disregarding the law because of the identity of the defendant (whether by name or by racial identity). Nullification (as I am using the term), in contrast, is about disregarding the law because the law is manifestly unjust.

    Of course, I recognize the problem of distinguishing one from the other when deliberations are secret.

    In any event, I appreciate your willingness to expound upon your earlier comment. Take care.

  16. It is an important difference morally, but either has a destructive element given the fact that we have appellate courts to remedy manifestly unfair laws. If jury nullification never flowed outside of refusing to apply unfair laws I would tend to agree with you completely, however as you note when we can’t tell which it is, I think we should trust the rule of law and provide for its enforceability. Thanks for the dialogue. Dean

  17. I’ve been part of voir dire twice, and ended up serving on the jury once. The judge debriefed us and offered the opportunity to speak with counsel. As with the verdict, the jury was unanimous – nobody wanted to talk to the lawyers. I was surprised by what went on the jury room – but pleasantly so. A diverse group did its best with the cases presented by the prosecutor and defense counsel. The jury understood and followed the defendant’s right not to testify. The defense counsel’s opening explained how the defendant would testify and say “x, y and z.” The defendant did not testify. Some juror’s reacted very negatively to the lawyer – “Why should we believe anything the lawyer told us? The lawyer lied.” So much for an effective closing argument. The jury members brought with them their experiences and perceptions. The juror comment about how a liability finding could ruin a life is explicable by legitimate as well as illegitimate bases – think carefully; is the evidence enough versus let ’em off because we don’t want to ruin the defendant’s life.

    Jury finality is important, as is not going behind the verdict. The potential for harm to the deliberation system is significant.

    The jurors I served with in voir dire and on the panel were glad to have done their duty, and glad to be done with their duty. Going behind the verdict means they might not be. That the juror alleged to have been improperly influenced denies the charge – including whether her daughter ever had an accident – should be irrelevant. The long-term consequences of abandoning the protection of deliberation secrecy are too great. Justice O’Connor got it right.

  18. This is a comment about interviewing jurors. It is based on a case I worked on in the Eighth Circuit, King v. Bowersox, 291 F.3d 539 (8th Cir. 2002). This case was a habeas from a Missouri state court verdict including two counts of murder.

    The defendant had argued on appeal in the Missouri Court of Appeals that the court erred in not granting a mistrial. A post-trial motion for a new trial was denied. It appeared that a photograph of one of the victims, together with memorial effects, had been placed across the hall from the entrance to the jury room. The opinion explained that the defendant made no attempt to supplement the motion by evidence such as the testimony of jurors or deputies having charge of the jury. Also, there was no showing that any juror had paid any attention to, or even saw, the display.

    The Eighth Circuit stated that “in the absence of any showing that the jury saw or was even aware of the hallway display, there was no duty of the state trial court to conduct an inquiry into the matter.”

    My thought based on Judge Kopf’s question: How could the defendant supplement the record by evidence, such as the testimony of jurors? How could the defendant show that the jury saw or was aware of the hallway display? Did the defendant have an obligation to investigate on his own after trial and contact the jurors about the hallway display if he wanted to raise the issue of the hallway display? Is it wise to encourage defendants to investigate what the jury saw or knew during trial, such as seeing or being influenced by the hallway display?

    Judge Kopf just wrote about a recent incident in which a juror overheard a comment by a judge. It seems in that case that the judge took the initiative to find out what happened, the juror was excused and the verdict resulted without further complications.

    In the King case, it is not clear to me how the defendant could have met the burden of showing that the jury saw the hallway display.

  19. When I was a pup prosecutor, I picked a jury in a case involving a black defendant where one member of the venire panel was a young black man who did not say a word during voir dire. Batson was relatively new (I am old), and the case law that would allow me to convince myself that I was striking the silent venireman because he worked for the post office, or had facial hair, or looked at me funny rather than because he was black did not yet exist, so he made it on to the jury. After the 11-1-hung-jury mistrial, angry jurors came to ask me to prosecute the holdout because, apparently, all he would say in deliberations was that he was not going to convict a brother. I did nothing with their complaints.

    Years later, after I left the prosecutor’s office and was a medical malpractice lawyer, I tried (and lost) a case where I learned after the verdict that a member of the jury had been sued by the defendant hospital and was served with the suit papers six days before jury selection began, but did not disclose that fact when asked in voir dire whether she had ever been a party to a lawsuit. My motion for new trial was denied by a judge who, like you, had “a visceral reaction against lawyers using post-verdict statements from jurors,” but that denial was reversed by the court of appeals.

    I think I was right to do nothing about the silent criminal juror and I think the court of appeals was right to reverse the case involving the silent malpractice juror. It’s asking a lot to expect jurors to anticipate how they will respond to evidence in a case they haven’t yet heard (which is one of many reasons that it’s crazy that judges regularly rely on jurors’ claims that they will be “fair,” whatever that means, to deny strikes for cause of folks who clearly have an agenda), and it strikes at the heart of deliberations to try to litigate whether a juror really meant it when he said he could be fair. But it’s not asking too much to expect that jurors will tell us the truth about their relevant life experiences when asked a direct question about them, and if they lie—and concealing an experience by failing to respond to a direct question is a lie under oath—they should be considered fair game.

    Under Roger’s Rules, a system that exists only in my head, Judge Bye got the result right but the rationale wrong, though I suspect you’re right about what the Supremes will do with the case. As I read the Warger case, and after taking a quick look through the transcript of the voir dire, it doesn’t appear that a direct question was asked about whether family members were involved in traffic accidents, so I would grant neither relief nor cert if I were magically transported to the Supreme Court. But if a direct question had been asked and the juror had lied by failing to respond, the system would have been subverted and I don’t think that verdict should have been allowed to stand. In terms of the integrity of the system I don’t see why it should make any difference whether the lie was discovered through external means (as happened in my malpractice case) or through discussions with jurors. The issue should turn on the juror’s violation of her oath, not the means by which we discovered that violation. I hate the fetish for finality. Cases must end, but ultimately it’s important that they end with integrity.

    The last CLE I attended on jury selection suggested that lawyers should include something along the following lines in every voir dire:

    If you are selected to serve on this jury, you will have duties and rights as a juror. One of your duties is to base your decision only on the facts you find to be proven in this case and the law the judge gives you in her instructions. One of your rights is to be part of a jury where all jurors live up to that duty. When you are deliberating, if a juror tries to have the case decided based on something other than the facts and the law in this case, you have a duty to tell them that they are not supposed to do that, and if they continue you have a right to notify the court that a juror is trying to bring outside influences into the deliberations. Is there anyone who could not do that?

    Is that approach more acceptable to you than post-verdict juror statements?

    Finally, you asked about interviews with jurors. Early in my career, I almost always talked to jurors and, to the extent ethically permissible, the trial judge after trial in an effort to see what I could do to become a better lawyer. I learned a great deal from my talks with the judges and very little from my talks with jurors. I learn the most from mistakes, but unless you’re a total ass most people (other than judges) don’t want to tell you to your face what they disliked about you, so I found jurors generally to be enthusiastically complimentary when they liked me and vaguely complimentary when they did not, but rarely willing to give much real insight. I eventually decided that to have any value, post-trial interviews need to be conducted by someone other than the trial lawyer himself.

  20. Roger,

    First, and truly, thank you for your thoughtful and thorough analysis.

    Second, you and I disagree on the importance of finality. That’s probably to be expected given the differences in our roles.

    Third, I continue to worry about the possible chilling effect of broadening Fed.R.Evid. 606.

    Fourth, let me meet you in the middle. I would allow you to ask during voir dire the “If you are selected to serve on this jury” question mentioned in your comment. Indeed, I would probably give a preliminary jury instruction along those lines if you requested such an instruction. Although there are very, very, very, very, very few rogue jurors, they do exist. I certainly want to know about such a juror while I may be able to do something about it and prior to the Rule 606 bar arising.

    Thanks for your well-thought-out engagement. All the best.


  21. Elaine,

    I read Judge Wollman’s opinion for the Eighth Circuit.

    As I understood the opinion, the display was in a public hallway. If an affidavit of person with knowledge had been provided by trial counsel to the trial court as soon as counsel became aware of the issue and the affidavit established that (1) the jury used the public hallway to enter in the morning, leave at night, go to lunch and on breaks, (2) the display was constantly in the hallway during the entire time the jury was deliberating, and (3) the display was sufficiently prominent that a passerby would have seen the display, the trial judge would have been forced to hold a hearing and it is likely that each juror would have been interrogated to determine whether that juror had seen the display.

    There is of course a question of invited error. That is, whether the defendant had some responsibility for the problem. My guess is that too would have been sorted out during the evidentiary hearing.

    I hope this is responsive to your comment. All the best.


  22. JJW,

    I am glad to hear of your service as a juror or prospective juror. My experience is similar to yours. The jury system works amazingly well, 99% of the jurors take their duties seriously, and jurors with very different backgrounds transcend those differences. Thanks for taking the time to provide your unique insights.

    All the best.


  23. MOK,
    Very true. This is constantly proven to me by the fact that my wife knows more about the law than I do, despite never having taken a law course in her life.

    Sometimes I’ll come home, flush with a new legal revelation. I wish to show off my newfound knowledge, and give her a complex and confusing fact pattern. Every single time she rolls her eyes, tells the correct answer answer off the top of her head, points out it’s just common sense, and leaves me feeling rather embarrassed that I just spent an hour’s worth of class time coming to that conclusion.

    If I could figure out how to convince her to write laws, I would. We need more people with common sense.

    -Southern Law Student

  24. Well, this is an interesting back and forth. I am reminded in reading it that there is an excellent note in the Drake Law Review from 1989 on the subject of Juror Bias Undiscovered During Voir Dire, written by a certain law student. See 39 Drake Law Review 201.

  25. So Dean, you’re an expert! I’ll try to find your article later, but in the meantime can I get your response to my hazarding a guess it would matter a great deal if a deception by a juror during voir dire was deliberate as opposed to inadvertent?

  26. Thanks for your comments. I used the Eighth Circuit website and was able to retrieve the brief filed by the government in this case. Thanks to the Eighth Circuit for having a brief from 2002 available on its website. That was very helpful.

    If I understand your comments, it seems that you are assuming that the trial judge was not aware of the photo display in the hallway. Following is an excerpt of the record of the Missouri state trial (this is from the government’s brief):

    [by defense counsel]: Your Honor, I’d also ask for a mistrial based on the fact that after closing argument, at no fault of either of the parties who were in the courtroom as part of the legal community, when the jurors left the courtroom to begin their deliberations, all 12 had to walk past a roughly — I’m going to say 18 inches by 24 inch framed color photograph of the decedent Hooks. Along with that framed photograph of Mr. Hooks was also a regular size snapshot placed in the Northeast corner of the frame of a picture of when he was a baby. [further discussion of display] I believe that possibly could prejudice some of the jurors, and I ask for a mistrial based on interfering with the jury in their deliberations.

    The Court: Mr. Moss?

    Mr. Moss: First of all, what Mr. Wegner’s referring to I saw late as I was leaving, and I really didn’t key into it. However, I did see a large picture over to the left about 10 to 12 feet or so … [comment that he didn’t know whether the jurors saw it]

    [defense counsel]: Just for the record’s purposes, the picture that I’m indicating was originally on a radiator leaning against the window, which was in between the door that the public would enter the courtroom and the door that the Judge would enter in — I swear to God, ask the sheriffs.

    Mr. Moss: Only time I saw it it was down —

    [defense counsel]: I know. She moved it.

    The Court: She moved it down after the jury went past.

    [defense counsel]: That’s where she had it originally. We can ask the sheriffs. I mean, there were other witnesses to where it was originally placed.

    The Court: Okay. The motion for a mistrial is denied.

    It seems that the judge and the attorneys all readily agreed that the photos were in the hall. The judge did not conduct a hearing and inquire of the jurors.

    This leads to the point I was discussing previously. If the defense attorney must present evidence that the jury saw or was influenced by the photos, how is he supposed to acquire that evidence? There was no evidence from a hearing because the judge did not conduct a hearing.

    Further, the Eighth Circuit opinion stated that “in the absence of any showing that the jury saw or was even aware of the hallway display, thee was no duty of the state trial court to conduct an inquiry into the matter.”

    If the trial court does not conduct an inquiry, must the defense attorney contact the jurors in order to make a showing that the jury saw or was aware of the hallway display?

    Just wondering.

  27. Everything is very open with a really clear explanation of the issues.
    It was truly informative. Your site is extremely helpful.
    Thank you for sharing!

  28. Pingback: Top News Clips for the Week of Sept. 13-19 | New Jersey Civil Justice Institute

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